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THE DEFINITION OF "INCOME"
UNDER A NEGATIVE INCOME TAX
WILLIAM A. KLEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Two Brief Prefatory Remarks
This article will review problems that arise when one begins to
prescribe, for purposes of an income-maintenance program like the
negative income tax," those individual economic resources that are
to be included to determine the appropriate level of benefits. Before
proceeding, however, two brief prefatory remarks seem appropriate.
First, the discursive nature of the discussion here is dictated by
my objective to review and to record for future use the most significant
considerations that molded a series of decisions on particular issues.
The ideas are not just my own but also those of the many intelligent,
experienced and dedicated people I have worked with in devising
rules for several negative income tax experiments. My objective in re-
cording these ideas is neither narcissistic nor wholly academic; the
ideas are some that others dealing with related issues arising in other
contexts will want to take into account. And the issues will inevitably
arise-if not in the context of an income-maintenance proposal, then
in the context of some other program, such as public housing or
medical care for the indigent, in which benefits are based on need.
Secondly, I ask the reader's indulgence for a compromise: the dis-
cussion may seem too detailed for the reader with only a general in-
terest and insufficiently detailed (perhaps even superficial) to specialists
interested in particular points.
0 Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. B.A., Harvard University,
1952, LL.B., 1957.
The research reported here was supported in part by funds granted to the Institute
for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin by the Office of Economic Op-
portunity pursuant to the provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. An
earlier version of this article was presented to the Institute as a discussion paper. The
conclusions are the sole responsibility of the author.
1. This article assumes the reader's familiarity with the basic features of the
negative income tax. Descriptions may be found in Klein, Some Basic Problems of Nega-
tive Income Taxation, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 776 [hereinafter cited as Klein, Basic Problems];
Tobin, Pechman & Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 YALE L.J. 1
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Tobin]; Comment, A Model Negative Income Tax Statute,
78 YALE L.J. 269 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Yale Statute]. See also Asimow & Klein, The
Negative Income Tax: Accounting Problems and a Proposed Solution, 8 HARv. J. LEGis. 1
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Asimow & Klein]; Klein, Familial Relationships and Economic
Well-Being: Family Unit Rules for a Negative Income Tax, 8 HARv. J. LEis. 361 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Klein, Family Unit].
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B. Positive and Negative Tax-Compared and Contrasted
The problems that will be examined in this article correspond to
those that arise under the positive income tax system when one tries
to define "income" or, more broadly, the proper base for raising general
revenues through personal taxation. It would be glossing over some
fundamental issues of income-maintenance theory and policy, however,
if one assumed a perfect parallel between the negative and the positive
tax systems and referred to the problem presently to be considered
as one of defining "income" or as one of defining the proper "tax"
base. Whether income is the proper base for measuring individual
economic resources for the negative income tax-even if it is granted
that income is the proper base for positive tax purposes-is a very
serious and perplexing question. Similarly, use of the concept of "taxa-
tion" when one refers to the reduction of benefit payments as a con-
sequence of individual resources may obscure a fundamental socio-
logical-philosophical question about the function and nature of in-
come-maintenance programs in present-day society. Although the very
phrase "negative income tax" is misleading, it will be used throughout
this article for convenience. For the same reason there will sometimes
be talk of defining "income," although the concept referred to is much
broader than income.
A principal distinction between the positive and the negative in-
come tax bases-a distinction that reveals the profound differences
between the two-lies in the fact that benefits under the negative in-
come tax 2 reflect not only a person's income but also his wealth or
2. There is, in fact, no such thing as "the" negative income tax. The appendix
to this article, pp. 488-90 infra, contains relevant portions of a model statute that the
author drafted with Professor Joel F. Handler for the President's Commission on In-
come Maintenance Programs (the Heineman Commission). [Section 8 of this proposed
statute, set out in the appendix, will hereinafter be cited as Model Statute.] See Handler
& Klein, A Model Statute Reflecting the Recommendations of the President's Commission
on Income Maintenance Programs in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON INCOME MMNTEN-
ANCE PROGRAMS: TECHNICAL STUDIES 293 (1970). That model statute, and particularly the
portion reproduced in the appendix, is derived largely from rules that this writer
developed for the University of Wisconsin's Institute for Research on Poverty income
maintenance experiment in New Jersey and later refined for purposes of the Institute's
rural income-maintenance experiment. See Klein, Rules for Rural Income Maintenance
Experiment (unpublished paper available from the author) [hereinafter cited as Rural
Rules]. Thus, the model relied upon here reflects the opinions of members of the Insti-
tute staff concerning the structure of a negative income tax statute. The Heineman
Commission model is also similar to, and to some extent draws upon, Yale Statute, which
in turn had drawn on the rules drafted for the New Jersey experiment and upon sug-
gestions in Tobin. Thus, it seems fair to say that there is some consensus about major
features of the negative income tax's definition of the "tax" base. There certainly has
been a consensus among experts with whom I have discussed the matter over the past
several years that a statute without a capital utilization component in the tax base
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capital, even though this wealth or capital produces an adequate re-
turn that itself will be counted as income and will thereby reduce
benefits.8 In traditional welfare programs a person could not receive
any benefits until he had exhausted all his savings and other assets
(with certain very limited exemptions). The same approach, though
with fairly generous exemptions, was reflected in the various versions
of the Nixon Administration's Family Assistance Plan.4 This approach
might be viewed as the equivalent of imposition of a 100 percent
tax on capital-and has been frequently so described in discussions
among proponents of the negative income tax. That mode of descrip-
tion is, of course, pejorative. Under the positive tax a 100 percent
rate on anything would be a patent outrage and any significant general
revenue measure in the nature of an annual capital levy (one that,
unlike a property tax, significantly exceeds actual or imputed income)
would deeply offend our historic commitment to capitalism and private
property.
Even in order to determine entitlement to welfare benefits, a rule
requiring exhaustion of assets as a condition of eligibility is objection-
able on several grounds. First, it simply seems heartless to force a
person, as a condition of receiving benefits needed for bare subsistence,
to rid himself of property that he may have worked all his life to ac-
quire and that may possess great emotional significance for him, among
other possibilities, as a symbol of his place in the mainstream of a
society in which virtue is frequently associated with ownership of
things. Secondly, an asset-exhaustion requirement may seem unfair in
that it leaves the frugal citizen very little, if at all, better off than the
prodigal. At the same time such a rule tends to reduce or eliminate
the incentive to save for a rainy day-or to save for any other reason.
And finally, it can be argued that such a rule unfairly discriminates
between the welfare beneficiary and the person who receives other
would be totally unacceptable to Congress and the public. Most of the objection to in-
cluding this component has been on grounds of administrative burdensomeness rather
than on grounds of fairness.
3. There are two separate issues arising from the ownership of wealth. One con-
cerns the possibility of investment in assets that yield little or no current tangible re-
turn. That is the problem of imputed income. The other problem is the policy decision
that a person ought to consume capital, at least to some extent, as a condition to re-
ceiving income-maintenance payments. The text here is concerned with this latter prob-
lem alone. Other significant distinctions between the positive tax system and traditional
welfare in their respective reckonings of economic well-being lie in the latter's concern
with such resources as the income or wealth of relatives and the potential income from
going to work or taking a better job. See Klein, Basic Problems at 786-87; Klein, From
the Thoughtful Tax Man, 44 T/xcs 461 (1966).
4. See H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2152(a)(2), 2154 (1971) (proposed Social Se-
curity Amendments of 1971) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 1].
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benefits from the government (even such generalized benefits as na-
tional defense). It is conceivable that every person might be allotted
a pro rata share of total government expenditures and be required to
pay his share by dipping into capital if his income is insufficient to
meet his share of the total burden. It seems quite unlikely that any-
one would seriously propose such a revenue system; but the traditional
welfare approach to assets is, at least in spirit, quite analogous.
Few people, however, are outraged by the idea of forcing welfare
beneficiaries to reduce the government's burdens by dipping into their
capital in order to forestall the need for welfare payments. Indeed, my
guess is that most people would probably be outraged by the absence
of an asset-utilization rule in a welfare program. The reasons why
this is so are not easy to pinpoint, but they probably reflect the fact
that welfare benefits are regarded differently from other governmental
benefits. They are, for one thing, more akin to charity, and traditionally
charity has been reserved for the destitute-probably because charities
have not had enough money to be more generous.5 Moreover, one
reason why people save is, as suggested above, to provide for a rainy
day. When the rainy day comes along it hardly seems draconian to
expect a person to make use of his rainy-day fund. Welfare benefits
are not, after all, the same as national defense; they are given to an
individual for his benefit alone. Accordingly, a "tax" based on a
benefit theory rather than an ability-to-pay theory may seem justified.
In short, even if eligibility rules for welfare benefits are viewed as
financing devices or tax rules, it must be remembered that the ap-
propriateness of a method of financing cannot be considered in-
dependently of the benefit that is being financed6 and it is by no
means self-evident that all benefits should be financed from general
revenues raised by taxes related to a single concept of ability to pay.
C. Negative Tax as a Response
to Changing Social Needs
At the same time, however, it may be that increasingly our
economic and social patterns require looking upon income-maintanance
programs not so much as charity and as a responsibility of the govern-
ment only in the last resort, but rather as a guarantee of protection for
all citizens against events over which they have little or no control.
Thus, it may be that the point has been reached at which it is necessary
increasingly to accept the proposition that unemployment is a burden
5. See Klein, Basic Problems at 782-86, pointing out that a capital-exhaustion rule
ensures that limited welfare funds are distributed to those who are most needy.
6. See J. BUCHANAN, PuBLic FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS (1967).
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imposed almost randomly and arbitrarily on people who cannot be
held responsible for this misfortune. To the extent that this is true,
recipients of income-maintenance benefits should be treated like other
citizens and the amount that they pay into the government till should
be determined by the same formula that determines the amount that
everyone else pays into the till, without regard to the amount or kinds
of benefits they happen to be receiving. This would lead to a complete
integration of income maintenance with the positive income tax, with
all citizens theoretically receiving income-maintenance payments, off-
set for all by a tax (presumably an income tax) based on a single
set of rules. The nation, however, has not yet come that far in its
thinking about welfare. The proposals that have been made for a
negative income tax 7 are a step in that direction, but basically they
reflect a compromise between the two extremes of ancient poor law
and the theory that income maintenance is everyone's "right."
To the extent that the broad-sweep tax base, of traditional welfare
is adopted, many (though by no means all) of the problems that arise
in defining "income" under the positive income tax do not arise
under the negative income tax. Questions of economic incentive and
administrability remain, and they are serious, but the most baffling
issues associated with the goal of achieving interpersonal fairness9
virtually disappear once it is decided that everything is to be counted,
not just income. On the other hand, to the extent it is decided that
the negative income tax is indeed to be an analogue of the positive
income tax, one must define income precisely; comparisons to the
positive tax system become useful for both concrete issues and general
philosophy, and one becomes involved in the perennial discourse of
tax theoreticians over what has recently become known as the question
of the comprehensive tax base."0
7. See note 1 supra.
8. I will hereinafter refer to the process of reducing welfare benefits by virtue of in-
come and other resources as one of taxation, because doing so seems to me to high-
light and clarify many issues.
9. The term usually used in the public finance literature is "equity" rather than
"fairness." I use the term "fairness" because it seems to describe more accurately the
kind of systematic, as opposed to individual, justice with which I am concerned.
10. See B. BiriKER, C. GALVIN, R. MUSGRAVE & J. PECHMAN, A COMPREHENSIVE TAX
BASE? (1968) [hereinafter cited as B. BITrKER, COMPREHENSIVE TAX BASE]. This volume
is a compilation of the following series of articles: Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base"
as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARv. L. REv. 925 (1967); Musgrave, In Defense of
an Income Concept, 81 HAtv. L. REv. 44 (1967); Pechman, Comprehensive Income
Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARv. L. REV. 63 (1967); Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and
the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicalities of Tax Reform and ABA's CSTR, 81
HAv. L. REv. 1016 (1968); Bittker, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Response, 81
HAav. L. REv. 1032 (1968).
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D. The Bittker Debate-Fairness Overexalted?
The debate generated recently by Professor Bittker over the com-
prehensive tax base revolves about significance of the Haig-Simons de-
finition of income in shaping the federal income tax structure. In a
book subtitled, "The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal
Policy," Simons had this to say about the problem thus delineated:
Personal income connotes, broadly, the exercise of control over the
use of society's scarce resources. It has to do not with sensations,
services, or goods but rather with rights which command prices (or
to which prices may be imputed). Its calculation implies estimate (a)
of the amount by which the value of a person's store of property
rights would have increased, as between the beginning and end of
the period, if he had consumed (destroyed) nothing, or (b) of the
value of rights which he might have exercised in consumption
without altering the value of his store of rights. In other words, it
implies estimate of consumption and accumulation. Consumption as
a quantity denotes the value of rights exercised in a certain way (in
destruction of economic goods); accumulation denotes the change
in ownership of valuable rights as between the beginning and end
of a period.-
Summarizing these ideas, he produced this frequently cited formula-
tion:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change
in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning
and end of the period in question.12
This formulation produces the comprehensive tax base-one that in-
cludes all net receipts regardless of source or nature.
As Professor Bittker pointed out, the Simons position "has come to
be the major organizing concept in most serious discussions of our
Later articles that have made very important contributions to the comprehensive tax
base debate include a thorough, meticulous study by Professor William D. Andrews
which lends support to the Bittker position. See Andrews, Personal Deductions in an
Ideal Income Tax, 86 HAqv. L. REv. 309 (1972). Professor Bittker himself has added
two brilliantly written articles, each of which is virtually dispositive of its subject
matter. See Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political Rhetoric, 71 MzcH. L. Rxv.
1099 (1973); Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?,
28 TAx L. Rxv. 37 (1972).
11. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAxATION 49-50 (1938).
12. Id. at 50.
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federal income tax structure."13 Professor Bittker's own position is
that, in light of the myriad exceptions that are sanctioned by general
acceptance and required by common sense, the proponents of the
Simons view cannot really mean what they say and the Simons formu-
lation cannot play the significant role in policy development that its
adherents seem to claim for it.1"
This author's view is that Professor Bittker, though perhaps ap-
pearing too nihilistic, clearly is on the right track.-5 I can best sum-
marize the Bittker-generated debate and at the same time create a
framework and reference point for much of the remainder of this
article by explaining why I take this position. This requires a return
to fundamentals.
The goal in shaping the federal income tax laws is to devise an
instrument that raises general revenue and still achieves an optimal
balance among the many other purposes that must be served by a tax
system and that often are in conflict with one another.1 Obviously,
then, the ideal instrument will not be one that would be ideal if
judged solely in terms of one of these goals alone. Of the several
significant goals of tax policy, one is fairness; the system of rules must
treat similarly situated people alike. The weakness of much tax-policy
discussion appears to lie in a tendency to judge the tax system almost
exclusively by this criterion, thereby giving inadequate consideration
to others. Certainly Simons focused most of his attention on problems
of fairness. Sometimes it is said that fairness is more important than
other considerations, but the operational content of that statement is
virtually impossible to specify. To say that fairness should be served
unless it is outweighed by other goals is like saying that fairness should
prevail except when it should not, which, of course, is a vacuous
statement. Still, one can concede that fairness is always an important
goal, and one cannot escape the challenge of trying to achieve fair-
ness, of trying to identify what it is that makes people similar and
dissimilar.
Similarity must be measured by a standard tied to some objective.
For example, to select members of a football team, the standard might
consist of size, speed and agility, and fairness would consist of giving
equal treatment to players who are similarly big, fast and agile. In
13. See B. Brrrm, COMPPEHENSIVE TAX BASE 1.
14. Id. at 10, 56-61 & passim.
15. See Klein, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 633, 636-37 (1969); Klein, Federal
Income Tax Reform, A Reaction to Professor Blum's Twenty Questions, 42 TAXES 175(1964).
16. For an excellent, but brief, array of tax system goals, see J. Summ, Tua CoN-
IGuRATIoNs oF GRoss INCOME 3-5 (1967).
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order to shape a general revenue system, the standard probably ought
to be related to economic capacity or ability to pay. By adopting that
general standard, to be sure, one might be sacrificing the opportunity
to achieve even greater fairness by acknowledging other factors such
as benefit received, but this article will ignore that dimension of the
problem and assume that the correct standard is ability to pay. I
suggest-and this point seems to me to be vital-that if one were
interested only in achieving the most accurate measure of ability to
pay one would examine not just income but several other factors as
well. For example, two men with equal incomes might have entirely
different tastes for the things that money can buy, and that certainly
would be a relevant factor in determining their relative abilities to
pay. The more such factors that could be included, the closer one
would come to a perfect measure of similarity and dissimilarity of
ability to pay. The objection to acknowledging factors such as taste
for money is not that doing so, if it could be done accurately and
without cost, would fail to promote fairness. The objection is based
upon another characteristic of a good tax system-administrative feasi-
bility. Of necessity there must be an accommodation between the con-
flicting goals of fairness and administrative feasibility (as well as be-
tween these and other goals or criteria).
"[T]his is man's justice, not God's."'1 It is the best a govern-
ment can do. And I suggest that this would be so even if economic
costs were ignored because, in achieving man's justice, it is important
to have standards that can be administered as objectively and imper-
sonally as possible. This author has tried to suggest why this is so, stat-
ing that the importance of objectivity
seems to lie in the proposition that the government, in collecting
taxes, should become involved as little as possible in making inter-
personal comparisons. It is thought that government cannot make
such comparisons without arousing the antagonism and re-
sentment of the many people who (it is presumed) will inevitably
think that others have, without reason, been treated better than
they have. This problem is perhaps especially acute in an area such
as taxation which is patently political and in which competing
claims based on pleas of equity and fairness are not commensurable.' 8
E. The Role of Income for Determining a Tax Base
The foregoing discussion attempted to establish that income is a
17. Stein, What's Wrong with the Federal Tax System?, in 1 HOuSE COMM. ON WAYS
& MEANS, TAX REvSoN COMPENDIUM, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 107, 112 (1959).
18. Klein, Federal Income Tax Reform, supra note 15, at 176 (footnote omitted).
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rough measure of similarity of capacity to contribute to the general
revenue. It is a crude device for achieving fairness. Its virtue lies in
the fact that it is a reasonably good measure of similarity while at
the same time it is reasonably consistent with the goal of administrabili-
ty (and its subcategory, objectivity). To the extent that the concept of
"income" has a substantial content or meaning that exists independent-
ly of the tax system, its use will serve "the justice of the distribution
of prizes in an unrigged game that all can play."'1 There can, of
course, be deviations from the externally related concept that are
based on objectively determinable phenomena and that therefore avoid
personalized determinations by government officials vested with broad
powers. But to the extent that people cannot understand and appreciate
the grounds for such deviations, they will feel that the system is un-
fairly rigged; this is the best argument for the comprehensive tax
base. 0
What, then, of the Simons formulation or definition of income?
In this author's view it is merely a good touchstone for defining in-
come. It is obviously too vague and too broad to be much more. It
flourishes because it happens to work reasonably well-as long as it
is-not taken too seriously.
To recapitulate: (1) fairness is one of the several goals or criteria
of a good tax system; (2) income is a good rough measure of similarity
of capacity to contribute to the general revenue; and (3) the Simons
definition of income is a viable, reasonably concrete concept that
corresponds reasonably well to a phenomenon external to the tax
system (the layman's idea of income) and that produces reasonably
satisfactory results when applied with discretion.
Despite this agnostic view of the Simons definition of income and
despite this author's inability to see the luster in the comprehensive
tax base, the tax base devised here and endorsed for purposes of the
negative income tax is one that should endear him to Simons and
his disciples. As in other affairs, the behavior of apostates is often
indistinguishable from that of true believers. The differences arise
19. Stein, supra note 17, at 111.
20. Cf. Blum, More on "Twenty Questions," 42 TAXES 180, 182 (1964), stating:
"As the stew becomes thicker we simply will lose our ability to make meaningful
comparisons between persons-the only general standard on which the equity of a
direct tax can be tested."
It is also sometimes argued that by conceding the acceptability of the principle
of departing from a rigid concept of income broadly defined we encourage the prolifera-
tion of departures, and that experience teaches us that most departures will be unwise.
But that is a matter of political strategy not of the fairness of the system. And I doubt,
in fact, that it is true that the "bad" departures are significantly increased by virtue
of the presence of "good" departures.
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mostly with respect to wealth utilization provisions rather than with
income provisions. This does not mean, however, that a truce in the
battle over the positive tax base is imminent. Deafness to the rallying
call of the comprehensive tax base leads this author to be much more
impressed than otherwise he would be with, among other things, the
significance of economic adjustments to mistakes of the past ("old
taxes are good taxes") and to be much more tolerant of the use of the
tax system for economic stimulation or to buy votes on other programs.
For the negative income tax, however, such considerations may not
seem important.
F. The Possibility of Using the Negative Income Tax for Achieving
Certain Economic Objectives
Consider this question: Should the interest on bonds issued by state
and local governments be exempt from taxation-that is, should such
interest be ignored in counting income-for purposes of the negative
income tax as it is for purposes of the positive income tax? The ration-
ale usually offered for the positive tax exemption is that it reduces the
cost of financing state and local government by inducing people to
accept a lower rate of interest on such bonds than they would insist
upon for taxable bonds. The federal government sacrifices revenue
for the sake of conferring a benefit on state and local units. In the
process it bestows on some individuals tax benefits that unequivocally
offend the criterion of interpersonal fairness. The unfairness-the wind-
fall to the individual-is accepted for the sake of the contribution to
federalism. Why, then, should not the same kind of benefit be con-
ferred by the negative income tax? After all, no one would suggest
that certain rentiers receive the benefit of tax exempt interest because
people whose income is from other sources deserve to pay more and
the people who own the tax exempt bonds deserve to pay less. So the
poor need not be deserving in order to reap the windfall; all they have
to do is promote federalism by buying the low-yield bonds. Moreover,
a dollar lost in taxes by virtue of the exemption is worth no less to the
government than the dollar that would be lost by virtue of the same
exemption in the negative income tax. It may be suggested that there
is no sense to a negative income tax exemption because the poor do
not have funds to invest in bonds anyway. That argument simply will
not wash. To the extent that the poor fail to take advantage of the
exemption it costs the government nothing; to the extent that they
do, the objective of the exemption is achieved and the cost to the
government is just as readily justified as it is in the case of the positive
tax system.
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What about the wealthy person whose entire capital is invested in
tax-exempt bonds and who, as a result, has no taxable income? Should
he be permitted to claim income-maintenance payments along with
his tax bounty? Why not? As pointed out earlier, the payment of
those income-maintenance dollars hurts the rest of the taxpaying public
no more than the loss of the tax dollars. So why draw a line?
A similar argument can, of course, be applied to other holes in the
tax net, such as percentage depletion. The dollar that an oil millionaire
"is ahead by virtue of an extra-generous depletion allowance is worth
just as much to him, and costs other taxpayers just as much in addi-
tional burden, as money that he would be ahead by virtue of a pay-
ment under the negative income tax."121
Possibly the only answer to this is simply that enough is enough.
Or perhaps people think that the poor should set a shining example of
fiscal rectitude. Maybe the idea is that people won't miss the income-
maintenance benefits that they never had. In any event, there is appar-
ently no significant support for the proposition that the poor should
be treated to the same tax "incentive" windfalls as the rich.
Before examining specific issues, two additional general observa-
tions should be made. First, this writer's inclination as a lawyer, and
particularly, perhaps, as a tax lawyer, has been to draft a statute that
is reasonably explicit, one that apprises people formally and openly of
rules that they can rely on. This is a departure from the "your-friendly-
caseworker-knows-all" attitude of traditional welfare, under which
legislatures have typically written mandates to the welfare administra-
tors about as explicit as the injunction, "go out and do right."22
Secondly, it must be recognized that some of the rules that may seem
out of place in a poverty-relief program, such as rules relating to oil
depletion, are designed to prevent "horror" cases, such as welfare
payments to the oil millionaire who, by virtue of percentage depletion,
has no taxable income. It is a far greater "horror" that the government
is deprived of many thousands of dollars of tax revenue from such a
person than that it might be deprived of a few dollars of welfare pay-
ments, but that is another matter.
II. GIFs, SUPPORT, ALIMONY, INHERITANCES AND
LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS 2 8
In one of the most significant and revealing chapters in his classic
work on the definition of income, Simons argues for inclusion of gifts
21. Klein, Basic Problems at 785.
22. See Klein, From the Thoughtful Tax Man, 44 TAXES 461 (1966).
23. See Model Statute §§ 8(B)(3)-(4), 8(C)(2)-(3).
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and inheritances in the tax base.2 4 That argument serves as the theo-
retical foundation for an important distinction between the negative
and the positive income tax-namely, the inclusion in the negative in-
come tax base of gifts from persons who are not members of the family
unit.25 The reason for inclusion of gifts and similar receipts is simple,
though often difficult to grasp for people who are accustomed to the
existing positive tax system or who are mesmerized by the word "in-
come." 26 Properly understood, the income tax is not really a tax on
income but rather a tax on people according to their income. The
source or nature of receipts that enhance one's wealth is irrelevant.
From the viewpoint of the recipient, money is money; money that is
received as a gift is worth no less than money received as wages. The
argument has been made that even under a negative income tax, gifts
should be excluded (at least in part) because otherwise potential
donors may be discouraged from making gifts2 7 and presumably gifts
to the poor should be encouraged. This is much like the kind of argu-
ment so familiar in the positive tax system-that fairness should be
sacrificed 28 for the sake of economic incentive. Even if this dangerous
gospel were embraced with respect to gifts, 29 there would remain an-
other serious objection to excluding gifts from the tax base. The ob-
jection arises from the fact that support payments will be included in
income (for reasons that will be stated shortly) and that it would be
24. See H. SIMONS, supra note 11, at 125-43. To argue that gifts are income is to
ignore common parlance. As suggested above, pp. 455-57 supra, an argument can be
made for adherence to a standard (the layman's or accountant's definition of income)
that is external to the tax system and that thereby promotes objectivity. On balance,
however, it seems appropriate to sacrifice that form of objectivity for the sake of the
greater fairness that is achieved by including gifts and inheritances in the tax base. See
Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income Tax: The Meaning of the Word "Gift," 48
MINN. L. REv. 215, 224 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Klein, An Enigma].
25. If the family is treated as the appropriate unit for purposes of measuring economic
well-being see Klein, Family Unit passim, then transfers within the unit must be ignored
since they do not alter the economic well-being of the unit.
26. See note 24 supra.
27. See Tobin at 13-14.
28. The individual with income in the form of gifts would pay no tax while the
individual with the same income from wages would pay a full tax. The argument
based on effect on donors implicitly accepts the Simons definition and thus concedes
that the difference in tax liability is inequitable.
29. It is curious that Joseph Pechman, a strong proponent of the comprehensive
tax base, should accept this kind of erosion of the negative income tax base, see Tobin
at 13, while a skeptic like me should regard the argument for it as wholly unpersuasive.
My guess is that the explanation for this reversal of roles lies, at least in part, in
different appraisals of the relationship between giving and favorable tax treatment of
the recipient, and thus in different estimates of how much incentive would be achieved
at the cost of how much unfairness. My view on this issue is no doubt related to the
point that is discussed next in text-namely, that gifts to the poor will ordinarily be
difficult to distinguish from support payments.
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very difficult to distinguish gifts from support payments.80 Indeed, it
has seemed to this author that once it is decided to include support
payments in income, the necessity for including gifts becomes almost
inescapable to anyone who thinks seriously about how to draw a line
between the two. To be sure, the problem of drawing the line is not
likely to be serious in the case of support of minor children by their
parents for two reasons. First, if the tax unit is the family, as is likely,
then transfers (including support) within the family will be ignored
regardless of whether they might otherwise be income. Secondly, al-
most any amount actually spent on a minor child is likely to be re-
garded as support; other transfers, such as the creation of a savings
account or the gift of a luxury item, are likely to be rare. The line-
drawing problems will be more serious, however, in the case of trans-
fers to other persons, such as adult children, parents, brothers and
sisters. What the legal or moral obligation of support may be in such
cases becomes much less obvious and it is even difficult to imagine any
commonly accepted nonlegal basis for differentiating between gifts
and support-largely because in the past there has been little reason
for differentiation.
If gifts are to be included then it should be made clear that gifts
in kind, including food and lodging, must be treated the same as
cash gifts. That raises the obvious administrative problem of estimating
the value of in-kind gifts; rules of thumb would no doubt need to be
developed. But it would be grossly inequitable to include gifts in
cash and not gifts in kind. It does, of course, make sense to ignore cer-
tain kinds of benefits,31 such as a dinner bought at a restaurant by a
parent for his child. To some extent administrative discretion can be
relied upon to eliminate such problems, but it also seems useful to
have a flat exemption to cover trivial benefits. 82
The Model Statute contains a provision that treats trust distribu-
tions of capital as income, on the theory that these distributions are
like gifts for which delivery has been delayed. That provision was not,
30. See Klein, An Enigma at 226 n.50.
31. See H. SIMONS, supra note 11, at 135-36.
32. Such an exemption might become an umbrella for regular cash gifts, as ex-
perience with the $3,000 per year federal gift tax exemption illustrates. Nonetheless,
the rules for the rural negative income tax experiment seem to limit the exemption
both too severely and at the same time not severely enough in providing for inclusion
of all gifts "except that gifts for special occasions (e.g., birthdays, anniversaries, gradua-
tion, Christmas, etc.) [are] included only to the extent that they exceed $50 in value (to the
recipient) per gift." Rural Rules at 16. The limitation by occasion seems too restrictive; the
$50 per gift not restrictive enough. The idea of value "to the recipient" is a very sensible
one. The enforcement problem has led one writer to suggest exemption of all gifts.
Popkin, Administration of a Negative Income Tax. 78 YALE L.J. 388, 392-93 (1969).
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however, intended to cover distributions of capital that had previously
been reported for tax purposes by the distributee-as, for example, in
the case of a distribution of the corpus of a revocable trust that the
distributee had established with his own funds.3 3
As in the positive tax system, alimony34 payments are included in
the income of the recipient and are deductible by the payor. The
negative income tax, unlike the positive tax, does treat support pay-
ments the same way, 5 and the reasons for this seem obvious. The nega-
tive income tax is, after all, an effort to respond to the problems of
economic need; a person who receives support from someone else has
reduced his need to that extent and it would seem absurd to ignore
the fact. Alimony and support are likely to be major components of
the resources of many families. Thus, whatever may be the justification
for excluding support payments from income for purposes of the
positive income tax, the appropriateness of inclusion for purposes of
the negative income tax seems beyond dispute.
There is one problem with alimony and support payments that
is not so easily resolved: the lump-sum settlement. In the positive
tax system lump-sum transfers incident to the dissolution of a marriage
are not treated as income to the recipient.8 6 The rationale for this rule
is that such transfers are in the nature of capital divisions. For example,
suppose that a husband and wife have two cars, and that the husband
has legal title to both. Assume that, incident to divorce, the wife takes
one car and the husband takes the other car, or that the husband
transfers the house and the savings account to the wife. It seems in-
appropriate to treat such transfers as income to the wife; it would be
unrealistic to think of her as having become richer.87 Rather, there
33. The Model Statute inclusion of all trust distributions of capital reflects a
sacrifice of accuracy for simplicity. A provision dealing precisely with all possible trust
arrangements would have been excessively complex, but the problem of how to treat
ordinary distributions of capital from a trust seemed to me sufficiently significant to
warrant some mention in the statute.
34. Technically it is unnecessary to have a rule expressly including alimony in
income, since the rules begin with a provision sweeping in everything that would be in-
cluded in adjusted gross income under the Internal Revenue Code, and that covers
alimony. While technically unnecessary, express inclusion serves to avoid confusion for
people who are not familiar with the Code or who lose sight of the general provision
and who would begin to wonder about alimony when they note the inclusion of support
payments.
35. The Model Statute fails to make clear, as it should and as the rural statute
does, that support in kind, as well as cash support payments, should be included.
36. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 71. Nor are such transfers treated as gifts for gift-tax
purposes. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2516.
37. It may be that in a more legalistic sense, too, she has not become more
wealthy on the occasion of the divorce, since marriage gave her inchoate claims against
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has been what most people would consider, in most cases, a mere
division of the family assets. 8 Thus, such lump-sum settlements 9
should not be regarded as gifts, alimony or support payments, and
should be excluded from income. The rule should be limited, how-
ever, to transfers between husband and wife.4 0 No matter how badly
a child wants, and feels he deserves, his father's wealth, he does not
have the same kind of claim to it that a wife has to assets held in her
husband's name.
Inheritances and life insurance proceeds are included in income for
essentially the same reason that gifts are included. There is an excep-
tion, however, for inheritances from a deceased spouse, for the same
reason that a lump-sum settlement incident to divorce is excluded-
namely, that the assets passing by inheritance are likely to be thought
of as family assets that, as a practical matter, had belonged to the
survivor already. 41 Perhaps by analogy one could justify a modest ex-
clusion for property passing to children by reason of the death of a
parent, though in my view such inheritances seem enough like substi-
tutes for support payments to justify their full inclusion.4 2
III. CAPITAL UTILIZATION4 3
Already examined in general terms was the question of whether
the level of an individual's benefits should vary with his wealth or
her husband in the event of divorce. On this theory, the enrichment occurred at the
wedding or during the marriage. But see United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
38. In community property states this is the legally correct characterization with
respect to property acquired from earnings during marriage. One reason for excluding the
lump-sum settlement from income, then, is to eliminate disparities between states based
on their property law.
Any attempt to distinguish between assets acquired from earnings during marriage
and assets held before marriage or inherited would seem unduly complex and sophisti-
cated for purposes of the negative income tax, particularly in light of the fact that
inclusion of an item in income will only affect payments for a limited period, probably
a year at most. See generally Asimow & Klein.
39. The rules of the positive tax system can be used to distinguish between lump-
sum transfers in installments and alimony or support, though somewhat more restrictive
rules might be thought appropriate for purposes of the negative income tax.
40. Normally transfers during marriage will be excluded by virtue of the fact that
they will be transfers within the same unit. If the husband has deserted but there has
been no divorce or other legal separation, it is more difficult to fashion a rule providing
for exclusion of lump-sum settlements; it seems advisable, therefore, simply to treat
all payments as support. Thus, the negative income tax should follow the positive tax
rule limiting the exclusion of lump-sum settlements to those transfers that are in-
corporated into a judicial decree of divorce or separate maintenance.
41. See H. SIMONS, supra note 11, at 142-43.
42. Again, one must be careful not to exaggerate the significance of inclusion of a
substantial lump sum. The inclusion of income will affect payments for a limited
period. See note 38 supra.
43. See Model Statute §§ 8(B)(1), 8(B)(9), 8(B)(17)-(18), 8(B)(24).
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capital-in other words, whether an individual should be expected
to support himself by dipping into capital, before turning to the
government for income-maintenance payments. Assuming an affirma-
tive answer to this question, the problem now to be considered is,
how far should the utilization-of-capital concept be carried-that is,
at what rate should capital putatively be consumed and what kinds of
assets should be exempt?
Preliminarily, the distinction between capital utilization and im-
puted income must be emphasized. Suppose a person owns 10,000 dol-
lars worth of publicly traded common stock" and that the stock pays no
dividends, but experiences capital appreciation at a rate of five per-
cent a year. Although the owner will have no income for positive tax
purposes, we can assume that he expects gain in the form of capital
appreciation. A strong case can be made for imputing a return at the
market rate and for including this amount in income.4 5 At the same
time we might agree that in determining the level of benefits we should
assume that the individual can reasonably be expected to sell some
portion-say 10 percent-of his stock each year, or borrow a comparable
amount against it, and treat this amount as current income. Thus, the
owner of the common stock valued at 10,000 dollars would have im-
puted income of 500 dollars (five percent) and capital utilization in-
come of 1000 dollars. The reason for separate provisions to measure
imputed income and capital utilization "income" would be to assure
similar treatment for those whose assets yield differing current returns
below the codified fair market return. The original drafts of the rules
for the New Jersey income-maintenance experiment" contained the
44. Perhaps more typical among the poor would be ownership of comparable amounts
of farm land or other real property.
45. For situations in which there is some current income, but it is low, income
would be imputed at the market rate but actual income below that rate would be ig.
nored. The imputation of income at the market rate is far simpler than calculation and
inclusion in income of unrealized appreciation, and it does not seem unfair to tax
a person on the income he could have earned. The arguments for income imputation
on such assets as owner-occupied homes are familiar to tax theorists and are reviewed
briefly in section IV of this article. Basically, the argument for income imputation from
home ownership assumes a value of occupancy to the individual equal to his economic
opportunity cost. The argument for income imputation from investment assets can rest on
the analogous notion that the appreciation in the value of property that does not yield
income will equal the opportunity cost in current income. Alternatively, imputation of
income from investment assets could rest on the harsher notion that one ought to earn
as much as he can, and if he doesn't, we will nonetheless treat him as if he did-just as
we do in traditional welfare practice with a person who refuses to take a job.
46. These were rules drafted in 1967 during the planning stages of the New Jersey
experiment. Neither an imputed income (other than from home ownership) nor a
capital utilization provision was actually used in that experiment, since it was con-
cluded that such provisions would be more trouble administratively than they would be
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two separate components, "imputed income" and "utilization of
capital. ' '4 7 Ultimately, however, it was decided that this approach was
overly refined for application to the people for whom the negative in-
come tax is designed. Consequently, precision was sacrificed for
simplicity and administrative convenience, and the imputed income
component was dropped, with the thought that any concern about
imputed income could be allayed by the presence of the utilization-of-
capital provision.4 8
Another refinement that makes some sense but that was ultimately
rejected as excessively complicated and sophisticated concerns the rate
at which capital is to be utilized. Under traditional welfare and the
defunct Family Assistance Plan' 9 the rate of utilization has been 100
percent. That is, no benefits are paid until nonexempt assets have been
exhausted. Once this extreme position is abandoned, however, one is
confronted with the question of how fast a person should consume
his capital. One obvious consideration is his life expectancy. This
suggests that capital should be annuitized, or at least that the rate of
utilization should somehow vary with life expectancy. This was the
refinement that was ultimately abandoned. The rate finally adopted
for inclusion of capital in the tax base was 10 percent50-a nice, round,
easy-to-work-with figure that is about as liberal as it can be without
scrapping the capital utilization concept completely.
The potential harshness or unfairness of a capital utilization pro-
vision can be mitigated not only by a low rate but also by liberal
exemptions. Liberal exemptions also act to reduce some very serious
valuation problems. The decisions about exemption reflected in the
Model Statute5' seem reasonably self-explanatory. The dollar amounts
worth among the particular population selected for the experiment. In the rules for the
rural experiment a capital utilization provision was adopted and has been applied.
47. The same approach was later followed in Yale Statute §§ 12, 13.
48. This position is reflected in the Model Statute. The rural rules, however, do
contain a provision imputing income from home ownership. See Rural Rules at 17.
49. H.R. 1, § 2152(a)(2).
50. See Model Statute § 8(B)(24)(a). It must be noted that 10% is the amount that
is treated as income and that income is taxed at a rate less than 100%. Thus, a person
is putatively expected to consume capital at a rate less than 10% (depending on the
tax rate) if he chooses to live at the poverty level of resources. Alternatively, he can live
at a higher level by consuming the full 10% of his assets-just as he could live at a
higher rate by consuming fully a comparable amount of current earnings. Yale Statute
§ 13 incorporates an inclusion rate of 30% (in addition to imputed income at a rate
of 5%). Tobin at 18-19 wrote in terms of reducing benefits by 10% of capital; assuming,
as did that article, a 50% tax rate, this would be equivalent to inclusion in income
of 20% of capital.
51. See Model Statute § 8(B)(24)(b). A few minor points may need clarification.
The phrase "trade or business that includes an owner-occupied home" in § 8(B)(24)(i)
has reference primarily to farms.
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are matters of taste and unscientific judgment. Only one aspect seems
worthy of brief discussion: the use of separate exemptions for different
classes of property. The rationale for separate exemptions is dual.
First, it may seem more reasonable to expect a person to liquidate
for current consumption some kinds of assets (such as a bank account)
than others (such as a home or business). Secondly, if there is an
overall exemption and if a rough estimate suggests that the exemption
might be exceeded, all classes of assets must be valued. With separate
exemptions for different classes of property, valuation of some assets
can be avoided even if the value of another class of assets is so great
that any overall exemption would be exceeded. Similarly, valuation
problems may lead to a much higher exemption for difficult-to-value
assets, such as businesses, than for relatively easy-to-value assets, such
as stocks and bonds.
On the other hand, exemption by classes of assets inevitably pro-
duces unfairness. The person whose wealth is invested in one form of
property may be better off than the person whose wealth is invested
in another. At the same time, people will be induced to transfer their
wealth from low-exemption assets to high-exemption assets and there
may be no good reason for such economic incentives. On balance,
however, the drafters of the Model Statute elected to use separate
exemptions.
The use of separate exemptions requires that rules be fashioned
so that, before the exemption is applied, the value of each class of
assets is reduced by the debts those assets secure.52 This explains the
drafting technique of referring to the equity in each separate class
of assets. The reason for this approach, and its effects, can best be
explained by use of an example. Suppose that the exemption for
business assets is 10,000 dollars, and that the exemption for a home
is also 10,000 dollars. Suppose further that a man owns a business
with a value of 10,000 dollars, and that it serves as security for a loan
of 6000 dollars so that the man's equity in the business is 4000 dollars.
Finally, suppose that the man also owns a house with a value of 20,000
The exclusion in § 8(B)(24)(b)(v) for "the value of any pension, annuity, or retire-
ment benefit" should be expanded to cover life estates. The exclusion avoids overlap
with § 8(B)(1). The rural rules contain the additional phrase, "or of any other such
conditional assets that can reasonably be expected to terminate upon the members'
death," which strikes me as a sensible addition, though I might phrase it differently.
The rural rules seem to have achieved another improvement by striking "retirement
benefit" from their counterpart of § 8(B)(1) and from the exclusion in § 8(B)(24)(b)(v).
52. The alternative is to apply the exemption to the gross value of each class of
assets and then to offset the sum of all debts against the sum of net (after exemption)
values of all assets.
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dollars and a mortgage of 4000 dollars, leaving an equity of 16,000
dollars. Now, if the purpose of the exemption for homes is to "pro-
tect" the home up to a value of 10,000 dollars, and no further, this man
should have 6000 dollars included in his wealth because of his home
ownership. The mere fact that he will be "wasting" 6000 dollars
of his business exemption is irrelevant; a man who had no business
at all would be wasting the full 10,000 dollars exemption for business
assets. Yet to allow him to use any of that exemption for his home
would be in effect to adopt an overall exemption.
Obviously this hypothetical man can improve his position by mani-
pulation of his debts. If he can convince his banker to convert 6000
dollars of his business loan into a loan secured by the mortgage on
his home, his equity in each class of assets will be reduced to 10,000
dollars so that he will be able to use fully both exemptions and will
show no net wealth after exemptions. 53 This possibility simply reflects
the potential inequality of exemption by asset class.
Finally, under this rubric of capital utilization, brief mention
should be made of annuities, and retirement benefits from Social Se-
curity and the Railroad Retirement Act. In each of these there is
likely to be an element of recovery of an individual's own contribu-
tion-a recovery of his savings or capital. Under the positive tax system
there is already an exclusion for the capital-recovery element in pen-
sions and annuities. 54 This kind of capital return is, of course, the kind
that most people treat as income in the sense that they regard it as
available for purposes of current consumption. It may therefore seem
sensible to treat it as income for purposes of determining the need
for other benefits. At the same time, however, with this particular
53. To prevent this kind of manipulation, a rule could be drafted under which loans
are related to assets by the original purpose of the loan. But that approach makes much
less sense than might be imagined and would be difficult to administer. Suppose our
hypothetical man owned his home, with a $16,000 equity, and then borrowed $20,000
and bought a business worth $30,000 which served as security for the loan. Why can
it not be said that he borrowed the $20,000 to permit him to continue to own his home
while also owning the business? And what if he borrowed money using his home as
security and used the money to buy a business?
The problem of allocating loans to particular assets by reference to purpose is
handled under the current Code by denying a deduction for "interest on indebtedness in-
curred or continued to purchase or carry" tax-exempt bonds. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 265.
The problem is avoided under § 163(d) (added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969), which,
in effect, creates an overall, rather than an asset-by-asset, limitation on the interest
deduction. See INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 163(d).
54. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 72. Social Security retirement benefits were initially
exempt from tax by virtue of administrative ruling, Rev. Rul. 3447, 1941-1 CUM. BULL.
191, and are now exempt by administrative regulation. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-11(b) (1965).
The Railroad Retirement Act expressly exempts from taxation benefits under that Act.
45 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6334(a)(6).
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capital utilization rule as with others, there is a strong element
of unfairness and a strong danger of adverse effects on incentives. The
person who saves for retirement (whether voluntarily or not) and
acquires a pension or annuity (public or private) is taxed on those
savings, as they are used, under the negative income tax; the profligate
avoids this tax. To the extent that saving for retirement is voluntary
(and even the Social Security System is subject in the long run to the
control of its beneficiaries through the political process), the negative
income tax will tend to reduce the amount of saving for retirement.
It will also at least partially replace other means of providing for re-
tirement, which is not a function that many people would intentionally
assign to a negative income tax. These problems of equity and of disin-
centive to save cannot be ignored under the negative income tax any
more than they can be ignored under the positive tax system, and it
may well be that the negative income tax rules relating to periodic
lifetime benefits should ultimately be reconsidered. At the present
time, however, exclusion of the capital portion of such benefits from
the negative income tax base would require such a drastic alteration
of attitudes toward welfare that it would be futile to press the issue.
IV. IMPUTED, IN-KIND AND POTENTIAL INCOME
Section III analyzed the possibility of a general imputation of in-
come from all assets that do not yield otherwise-taxable returns. That
discussion focused primarily on the problem of investment assets that
produce gain in the form of capital appreciation rather than current
returns. Even conceding that imputation of income from such assets
would be unwise, it might be argued that there should be imputation
in the case of certain investments-most notably the owner-occupied
home-that yield significant returns in the form of current consump-
tion. One reason for distinguishing an owner-occupied home from an
investment in, for example, forest land, is that the gain on the forest
land will ultimately be realized in a taxable form, while the value
of the use of the home, if not captured currently, never will be taxed.
Moreover, it may be feasible to respond to the problem of imputing
income to the forest land by having a high rate for capital utilization
"income." But the same rate, if applied to the family home (without
a very large exemption), would be considered unacceptable. And the
forest land problem can probably be dismissed as trivial much more
readily than can the problem of the owner-occupied home.
In traditional welfare programs the determination of a person's
need, and thus the determination of the payment he will receive, is
usually based on a budget calculation that includes a separate compu-
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tation of housing costs. The person whose housing costs are reduced
because he owns his own home is simply held to have less need for
welfare payments, thus accounting for the imputed income from home
ownership. In the positive tax system there has never been any such
recognition of the value of home ownership, although the argument
has often been made that there should be.55 An argument on grounds
of fairness could be made for ignoring imputed income from home
ownership, but at best that argument would be a weak one.58 There
are other objections to imputation, however, that are more serious.
First of all, imputation of income to a family with no other income
will result in reduction of cash benefits below the level of the basic
allowance-that is, below a level that will presumably be bare sub-
sistence. This reduction will be tolerable in situations in which home
ownership results in a low level of out-of-pocket housing expenditure.
But it may be that the house is a reasonably valuable one-one that
the family could not afford to live in but for its equity-and that the
out-of-pocket costs (for mortgage payments, insurance, taxes, mainten-
ance and repair) are comparable to the average rents paid by non-
owners in otherwise similar economic circumstances; indeed, there
is some evidence that among the poor this is generally the case. 57 When
this is true, if there is a benefit reduction because of income imputation,
the family will be faced with a cruel choice: either to sell the house
55. See, e.g., R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 120-29 (1964).
56. One argument might be that since the gain from investment assets with low
current yields is ignored, the imputed income from home ownership should be ignored
as well: that one loophole justifies another. I would reject this argument on the ground
that it is never sensible to extend a source of inequity unless it is clear that the reason
for permitting that unfairness applies with equal force to the extension. Another argu-
ment that might be made for ignoring imputed income from home ownership is that
such income is comparable to the psychic return that might have been achieved by other
uses of the assets invested in the home. For example, suppose two people in identical
circumstances each inherit $10,000. One of them "blows" it on a lavish trip to Europe,
while the other "blows" it on a house that he could not otherwise have afforded. The
house buyer might genuinely think of his $10,000 as having been squandered just as if
he had spent it on a trip to Europe; it might therefore seem unfair to him that he should
be taxed on the return on that outlay while the person who did go to Europe is not
taxed on the psychic return on his outlay. This argument seems to me to have some
appeal, if it is assumed that the house buyer is not being relieved of a current expendi-
ture for housing that he otherwise would have incurred, so that the claim that his
gain is psychic has some basis in fact. (My guess is that many poor people are in a
comparable position: they own homes that they could not currently afford to rent.)
Even so, the house buyer has not in fact "blown" his $10,000;, he can always sell his
house and recover his investment (otherwise there would be no imputed income). And
he knows it. The fact that our tax system does not tax psychic gains cannot be used
as a justification for failure to tax more tangible returns without abandoning the entire
notion of an income tax.
57. See Measuring Retired Couples' Living Costs in Urban Areas, MoNrHLy LAB.
REv., Nov. 1969, at 3, 5-6.
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or to pare expenditures on food, clothing and other necessities, to a
level even below that provided by the basic allowance.58
Another problem with imputation, one that is both more obvious
and more serious, is the difficulty of administration. There are many
ways, of course, in which the amount of the imputed income can be
computed. Probably the simplest is to determine the owner's equity
in the house and then impute a return on this amount at the current
fair-market rate. 59 Even this kind of calculation is difficult because
it requires knowledge of the house's value-a piece of information that
may not be readily available and may change from year to year. More-
over, this method of imputation fails to take account of the rental
value of the house to its owner"0 or of actual out-of-pocket expenses.
Another approach to the problem of imputation is to estimate
rental value and reduce this by actual expenses, treating the difference
as income.6' This approach seems fair, assuming that accurate measures
of rental value and accurate records of expenses will be available. That
is a heroic assumption. At the very least, obtaining the needed infor-
mation would be very cumbersome.6 2 This administrative barrier by
itself would be enough to lead this author to the conclusion that im-
puted income from home ownership should be ignored. That conclu-
sion is buttressed by the observations previously made, that for most
poor people the out-of-pocket expenses of home ownership are likely
to equal the rents paid by nonowners in comparable economic circum-
stances, and that the need for benefit payments is not in fact reduced
by home ownership. Moreover, inclusion of home value in the amount
on which capital utilization income is based may reasonably be thought
to offset the failure to tax the imputed income.65
58. This element of harshness could be avoided by a rule under which imputation
could not exceed the difference between a reasonable housing allowance (perhaps a
reasonable portion of the basic allowance) and the amount of out-of-pocket housing
expenses. This solution produces inequities, to be sure, but perhaps these are less
serious than the inequities resulting from a complete disregard of the value of home
ownership.
59. See Tobin at 12.
60. For example, the house could be extremely valuable because the land on
which it rests is suitable for commercial development.
61. This is basically the approach of both the New Jersey and the rural experiments.
62. In the rural experiments the rules for imputation have become extremely complex
and rather arbitrary. In both the New Jersey and rural experiments it is my impression
that a great deal of ad hoc, individualized decision-making has been necessary and that
imputation has proved workable (and only barely so) solely because of the intelligence,
discretion and leniency with which ad hoc judgments have been made. I would be
quite pessimistic about the possibility of duplicating such a result on a nationwide
basis.
63. Under the Nixon Administration's Family Assistance Plan, H.R. 1, there is no
imputed income from home ownership. Eligibility for benefits depends on exhaustion of
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A problem related to that of imputed income from home owner-
ship is that of imputed income from living in publicly subsidized
housing. Again, imputation creates serious problems of administra-
tion-that is, of determining the fair-market rental value of the housing
-although these problems are by no means as severe as those arising
in the case of owner-occupied housing. Consideration must also be
given to the fact that a person may have used the subsidy to acquire
better housing than he would otherwise have purchased so that his
need for income maintenance payments is not reduced. To resolve these
problems, public housing might be viewed simply as a bargain pur-
chase that should be ignored like many other bargains. 4 Moreover, it
may be best to ignore the value of publicly subsidized housing in the
hope that such a policy will lead to the ultimate elimination of the
subsidy. If the negative income tax does not reflect the housing sub-
sidy then, at least if one can assume that there will be adequate nega-
tive income tax benefits, the housing authorities will tend to reduce
the subsidy by charging higher rents; ultimately there will be no need
for the subsidy. Welfare benefits will then probably assume the form
of cash payments rather than in-kind benefits. This is an effect that
proponents of the negative income tax applaud because it allows the
poor to make their own decisions about what they need the most.
These are all reasons why the Model Statute does not include an in-
come imputation for public housing.65
At some point, however, the value of low-rent or rent-free housing
cannot be ignored. Housing (and food) supplied with a job is often
intended as a substitute for other forms of compensation and clearly
must be included in income,66 despite problems of valuation. Only by
eliminating any reward for manipulation can the interests of equity
be protected and respect for the system be preserved. The fairest
standard for valuation seems to be value to the recipient in terms of
the amount that he saves, rather than the amount that the food or
housing might bring on the open market.
resources, including the home, but there is an exception to this rule for "the home,
to the extent that its value does not exceed such amount as the Secretary determines
to be reasonable." See H.R. 1, § 2154(a)(1).
64. Presumably, however, most other bargains are ignored because their value is
not determinable. The problem of valuation is less severe in the case of housing, though
it is still possible that the subsidized apartment is worth no more to its tenant than
what he pays for it.
65. For similar reasons there is no imputation for the value of food stamps, although
if it were clear that the food-stamp program were never to be eliminated then it seems
to me that the value of the stamps probably ought to be included.
66. See Model Statute §§ 8(B)(7), 8(B)(l1). Possibly there should be an exception
(as there is in the rural rules) for food and lodging received on a temporary job, on the
theory that normal living expenses are not reduced in such a case.
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Another issue that is frequently raised in discussions of imputed in-
come, particularly when one thinks of rural areas, is whether home-
grown food should be treated as a source of such income. A farmer,
for example, may seem considerably better off than a city dweller be-
cause of his ability to grow a vegetable garden and to raise and
slaughter animals. Unfortunately, difficulty of measuring the value of
home-grown food is great and, according to a recent Ways and Means
Committee Report, there are "studies which indicate that there is
generally very little net financial gain from home produce consumed
at home." 7 Thus this potential source of imputed income is also
best ignored.
At this point one may begin to reflect on the other economies and
diseconomies that a person may encounter, many of which are related
to geographic location. Clearly it is cheaper to live in some places
than in others, and the question therefore arises whether the negative
income tax should take account of this fact. My own view is that one
of the important distinctions between the negative income tax and
traditional welfare programs is that the negative income tax is not
so tightly tied to need; the individual is given more incentive to make
his own decisions and to improve his lot in various ways, including
the achievement of certain economies. The economic advantage of
living in a rural area is only one of a range of economies of which a
person might take advantage. One man might choose to live in the
country while another, while staying in the city, might decide to
economize by living in a very cheap room or eating very inexpensive
food. A welfare budget is, to be sure, a minimal budget for the average
family. But it is nonsense to suggest that some people cannot maintain
themselves adequately on less money. The freedom to make economic
choices is in my view something well worth preserving not only for
the sake of personal freedom, but also for the sake of encouraging
people to improve themselves. For this reason this author would ignore
the economies, and the diseconomies, of geographic location and would
have a single payment level for all parts of the country. Others, focus-
ing more on the meeting-the-minimum-needs function of income
maintenance programs, have disagreed. 6
At this point it is convenient to consider a problem that is closely
related to that of imputed income, namely, the problem of potential
income. One source of potential income is, of course, the job that an
unemployed but employable person might take. Conceivably one
67. H.R. REP. No. 91-904, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1970). The cited quotation is part
of the Report's explanation of the failure to include the value of home-grown food
in income for the purpose of the Family Assistance Plan.
68. See Yale Statute at 295-96, 299.
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might impute income to a person who turns down a job, 9 though per-
haps it is simplest to follow the traditional approach of declaring such
a person (and his family) ineligible for benefits. This raises the ques-
tion whether there should be a work test in the negative income tax-
a question that is beyond the scope of this article.
Another source of potential income is payments that might be
made from other government programs such as veterans' benefits.
Again, the question is the extent to which the negative income tax
should be designed to force people to seek such payments. In the
Family Assistance Plan, under which those payments were categorized
as unearned income and taxed at 100 percent, compulsion apparently
was thought to be necessary. 70 In the negative income tax scheme such
payments would be taxed like any other income, at a rate less than
100 percent; such compulsion seems unnecessary and therefore in-
appropriate.
A significant source of potential income is the gifts or legally re-
quired support payments given by relatives. Of course, amounts ac-
tually received from relatives (or anyone else) will be included in
income. Presumably minor children will not be allowed to claim bene-
fits themselves so they are not a problem. There is concern most often
about young persons, including college students, who lack independent
incomes, but have wealthy parents. No matter how wealthy the parent,
if he has no legal obligation to provide support and in fact refuses to
do so, it is difficult to see why his child's benefits should be reduced at
all.7 1 It may be thought sensible to place upon the child the burden
of establishing that in fact the parent has refused to provide support,
though the prospect of determining what constitutes "refusal" and
how it can be established is rather appalling. When the parent does
have an obligation to support, then perhaps the child should be ex-
pected to enforce that obligation. It would be exceedingly difficult to
determine how much the parent could be expected to contribute;
legally this is a matter of state law. In the interest of simplicity, how-
ever, an arbitrary portion of the parent's income might be treated as
imputed income of the child. The question that must also be faced
is whether other obligations of support, such as the child's obligation
69. The amount of the imputation can be sufficient to eliminate benefits for the
entire family or just for the person who refuses to work.
What about the possibility of imputing income for positive tax purposes to the pro-
fessor who easily can make more money, and thus make greater tax contribution to the
Treasury, by taking a job in industry?
70. H.R. 1. §§ 2152(g)(1), 2153(a)(2)(A); H.R. REP. No. 92-231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
175 (1971).
71. Of course, benefits might be denied to those individuals, in or out of college,
who refuse to earn their living. That is another matter.
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to support his parents, should also be the subject of a rule designed to
induce enforcement of the obligation. This author has heard no sugges-
tion that there should be such a rule. But if only parental obligations
to young children are the subject of such a rule, then it must be
recognized that the federal law is revising what has traditionally been
regarded as a matter for the states to decide. Efforts to deny bene-
fits to young people because of their life style or because they have
rejected their parents and shunned help from them are likely to produce
harsh and unfair results.7
2
V. MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
There are several sources of income for which it is virtually im-
possible to fashion any persuasive argument to justify the exclusion
from taxation that the present positive tax laws provide. For such
items-for example, certain prizes and awards and unemployment
compensation S-there is sufficient consensus on the desirability of in-
clusion in the tax base, even within the positive tax system, that no
discussion is included in this article. For other sources, such as capital
gain (excluded in part under the positive tax system and taxed in full
under the negative income tax), the consensus may not be so strong,s
72. Against the chance that this conclusion would not be accepted, we drafted the
following section that can be added to the Model Statute:
8(B)(25)(a) In the case of any person who is less than 21 years old, an amount
equal to one-tenth of the income (as defined in subsection 25(b) below) of his
parents (other than a parent who is a filer or a member of a unit receiving bene-
fits under this Part), except to the extent that it can be established, under Regula-
tions promulgated by the Secretary, by such person under 21 years old, if a filer, or
by the filer who claims such person as a member of his unit, that such parents
have no legal obligation to support such child, or cannot with reasonable diligence
on the part of the filer be induced to provide such legally required support; but
nothing herein shall alter or reduce the effect of section 8(B)(4), relating to the
inclusion of gifts and support payments in income.
(b) For the purposes of the subsection income means taxable income as de-
fined in section 63 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, less $5,000 for two
parents filing a joint return or $2,500 for each parent filing a separate return (or
treated as if filing as separate return under subsection 25(c) below).
(c) If the parents of a person under 21 years old do not file a joint return, and
if either of them files a joint return with some other person, the income of such
parent filing with such other person will be determined as if such parent had
filed a separate return.
73. See INT. RPv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 74, 104.
74. Probably the most persuasive arguments for special treatment of capital gains
have to do with the use of the tax system to promote economic growth (at the ex-
pense of current consumption) and with ensuring economic efficiency by reducing an
impediment to mobility of capital. Most people seem to think that a negative income
tax should not be designed to promote economic goals at the expense of the fisc, and
to the extent that that is the case the principal justification for special treatment of
capital gain under the positive tax system does not apply to the negative income tax.
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but no special problems arise under the negative income tax and
repetition of the pros and cons regarding inclusion in the positive tax
base would be pointless. Certain other items do, however, raise some
special problems and therefore deserve brief discussion.
The portion of a scholarship that is available for support (including
room and board provided in kind) certainly reduces a student's need
for negative income tax payments. A comparison with other sources
of financial support for students, such as parental gifts or summer
earnings, strongly suggests that such scholarships for living expenses
must be included in income.75 Under the positive tax system, the fact
that the scholarship is tied to a particular use might support two
separate arguments for exclusion. First, the value of the scholarship
may be difficult to estimate. The student who receives free room and
board may find the room so depressing and the food so tasteless that
his award is virtually worthless to him. Secondly, the scholarship can-
not be sold and it provides its recipient with no money to pay taxes.
These arguments have very little force in the positive tax system. They
seem to have even less force under the negative tax system, in light of
the latter's function as a device to provide subsistence and in light of
the fact that the "tax" under the negative tax system merely offsets
benefits. The propriety of treating the support portion of a scholar-
ship as income would therefore be reasonably clear but for another
provision that has characterized negative income tax proposals-name-
ly, the exclusion of public (and, in some proposals 76 private) benefits
based on need. To the extent that the amount of a scholarship is based
strictly on need, one can make much the same argument for exclusion
here that is made for exclusion of other benefits based on need. Still,
a scholarship is not usually regarded as charity in the same sense that
benefits conditioned solely on the recipient's poverty are; it has an in-
centive or reward element that makes it more like earnings. Moreover,
it might be difficult to distinguish between those scholarships that are
based strictly on need and those that are not. The arguments for ex-
clusion of welfare benefits based on need are by no means overwhelm-
ing. Accordingly, the Model Statute treats scholarships as income,
to the extent that they exceed the cost of tuition, fees and books. 77
An earlier part of this article discusses the question whether the negative income tax
ought to be designed to accomplish the same kinds of economic goals as does the
positive tax system and that discussion is, of course, pertinent to the question of the
proper treatment of capital gains. See pp. 458-59 supra.
75. That comparison also suggests that tuition scholarships should be included in
income.
76. See Yale Statute at 311 (§ 1l(b)(4)), 317. See also Tobin at 13-14; H.R. 1, §
2152(b)(5).
77. See Model Statute § 8(B)(10). To the extent that scholarships are in fact based
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The portion of a scholarship that pays tuition, fees and book costs
raises similar difficulties but the balance of considerations seems to be
in favor of exclusion.78 It is true that the negative income tax recipient
who is receiving a scholarship is that much better off than the person
who must find some other way to finance his education. And if the tax
on the tuition portion of the scholarship leaves a person with that
much less than the basic, minimal negative income tax allowance, he
can work part time or make other adjustments in order to compensate
for the deficit. Buying an education can be compared to buying any
other extra for which the basic allowance does not provide. On the
other hand, the tuition scholarship does not relieve its recipient of any
basic support expense that the negative income tax is designed to
cover. It does not give him any assets over which he has control. More-
over, the value of the tuition scholarship to the recipient may reason-
ably be regarded as minimal in most cases. For example, consider the
person who accepts a full tuition scholarship to Harvard when he
could have attended a state college for virtually nothing, and would
have done so but for the scholarship. He has received a benefit, to be
sure, but it does not seem to be the kind of benefit that ought to be
recognized by the tax system any more than are a variety of govern-
mental services.
Publicly provided welfare benefits and their private charitable
counterparts are excluded from income under the positive tax system.
The foundation for that exclusion is shaky both as a matter of law
and as a matter of policy. Perhaps poor people should not be required
to pay income taxes and personal exemptions should be raised to en-
sure that they do not. But it is difficult to see why a person who earns
a given amount should pay a tax while a person who receives the same
amount as a welfare benefit does not. Exclusion also seems a crude
device for protecting poor people from tax burdens. A person may
receive welfare benefits during part of the year and later in the same
year may find a job and earn a reasonably good income, in which case,
on an annual basis, he is not poor. Perhaps the strongest arguments
for exclusion are: (1) that in most instances recipients are in fact poor
even on an annual basis and the other cases can be dismissed as trivial;
(2) that if a tax were imposed the benefit would have to be increased;
on need, they will be reduced by virtue of the negative income tax. This will mean that
the negative income tax will tend to replace scholarships as the principal means of sup-
porting poor students. This prospect raises the question of whether students should be
eligible for negative income tax payments. For a discussion of the problem see Klein,
Family Unit at 400.
78. Cf. H.R. 1, § 2153(b)(7), excluding from income the portion of a scholarship
"received for use in paying the cost of tuition and fees."
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and (3) that it is simpler to eliminate the tax.7 9 This theory justifies
exclusion of benefits supplied by government, and perhaps it is not
too great a leap to exclude privately supplied benefits, if such bene-
fits are viewed as substitutes for government benefits. If benefits be-
stowed by private charity are viewed as counterparts of ordinary gifts
and support payments from relatives and friends, however, the case
for exclusion becomes much weaker. The drafters of the Model Statute
finally decided (but with no great sense of conviction) that govern-
mentally supplied benefits based on need should be excluded but that
all privately supplied benefits should be taxed as income. 0
There is a special rule designed to reduce administrative problems
caused by payments from persons-particularly relatives-who are living
with a family but who are not members of the family unit for purposes
of the negative income tax. It is necessary to decide whether the pay-
ments made represent just a fair share of expenses or whether they
include as well an element of gift or profit., The drafters agreed that
it would be wise to have an arbitrary rule designed to eliminate any
question about such payments if they are within reasonable ranges.
Thus, the Model Statute provides that if the payment is 25 dollars
per week or less for room and boards2 then it is conclusively presumed
that the recipient has no net income from it. For higher payments the
recipient is permitted to prove higher costs.
Finally, two special provisions deserve brief explanation. First, in-
cluded in income is an amount equal to double the amount of any
79. We envisioned that the negative income tax would supplant other welfare pro-
grams and would provide payments adequate to meet all basic needs. Other remaining
welfare programs would therefore be ones designed to meet needs arising from special
circumstances. Where, as in the Family Assistance Plan, the basic allowance is quite
low, it must be supposed that state programs supplying basic needs will continue. This
raises extremely difficult problems of integrating the state and federal programs. Such
problems are beyond the scope of this article.
80. See Model Statute § 8(B)(4). A tax on privately supplied benefits will tend
to reduce individual disparities in welfare based on circumstances that are not recognized
as significant under any governmentally approved program. Whether or not that is
thought to be a good thing will depend in large part on the extent to which one thinks
that decisions on the welfare of the poor should be left in the hands of private chari-
ties.
81. The problem could also be viewed in terms of allocating costs for purposes of
arriving at a proper deduction for expenses. For boarders who are not relatives this
may be the most realistic way to approach the problem. For family members it seems
more realistic to think about a contribution to joint expenses plus a gift.
82. See Model Statute § 8(B)(4). In accordance with a general inclination to minimize
administrative discretion, we specified the amount of $25 for room and board in the
statute. Probably the amount should be tied to a price index and, arguably, it should be
an amount determined from time to time by the administering agency. Probably the
administering agency should be directed to promulgate rules to cover situations in which
varying numbers of means are supplied.
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income tax refund. This provision corresponds to one allowing a
double deduction of income taxes paid. This is the most convenient
way to offset entirely the effect of any positive tax that might be paid,
assuming a tax rate of 50 percent under the negative income tax."'
The reason for completely offsetting the effect of the positive tax is
simply to ensure that the rate of taxation decided upon under the
negative income tax is the effective rate for everyone receiving benefits
under it.84 Secondly, there is a provision treating as income certain
amounts that a person might receive from a trust.85 This is designed
to remove any incentive to refrain from making discretionary dis-
tributions from the trust.
VI. SPECIAL TREATMENT OF EARNED AND UNEARNED INCOME
The subject matter of this section, while perhaps strictly speaking
not part of the problem of defining income, is sufficiently closely re-
lated to that problem to deserve brief (and therefore admittedly su-
perficial) consideration. A reasonably complete discussion of whether
distinctions ought to be drawn between earned and unearned income
and, if so, how the line should be drawn, 6 would require another
article at least as long as this one.
To many-perhaps most-people it will not seem unreasonable to
view income-maintenance programs as "welfare" (in the sense of
quasi-charity) and to conclude that each individual ought to exhaust all
his own resources before turning to the government for help.87 Under
this very traditional view, a 100 percent tax on income and on capital
83. If the tax rate is something other than 50% then the amount of inclusion or
deduction is the amount of the tax multiplied by the reciprocal of the tax rate.
84. An argument can be made that a simple deduction of income taxes is enough.
See Asimow & Klein at 17-18 n.22.
85. See Model Statute § 8(B)(15).
86. Complexities that arise in distinguishing between earned and unearned income
have been exposed in other areas. Under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act, and the
corresponding provisions covering self-employment income, taxes are imposed only on
earned income (though the term "earned income" is not used). See INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §§ 3101, 1401. Old age insurance retirement benefits under the Social Security Act
may be reduced by virtue of earned income but not by virtue of unearned income.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 403(b), 403(f)(3), 403(f(5) (1970). Under both sets of provisions, there
has been extensive development of detailed rules and interpretations. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R.
404.1026-65 (1973). Under the positive income tax system the distinction has also been
applied, though sparingly. It appears most recently as part of the maximum tax on
earned income, under which earned income is entitled to certain benefits that are denied
to unearned income. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348; Asimow, Section 1348: The
Death of Mickey Mouse?, 58 CAL. L. REv. 801 (1970). See also Revenue Act of 1971, § 301,
adding §§ 4(d)(5), 141(e), and 144(a)(4) of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, relating to the avail-
ability of the standard deduction and low income allowance of dependents.
87. See discussion of capital utilization, pp. 463-68 supra.
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resources may seem perfectly fair and it may seem that the only reason
for a tax at less than 100 percent is to preserve incentives to earn in-
come and thereby reduce program costs. 8s This view was reflected in
the Family Assistance Plan, which imposed no tax on a limited amount
of earnings from employment and from self-employment and a tax
of 66 2/3 percent on such earnings above that amount.69 Most other
receipts are taxed at 100 percent, although there is an exception for
alimony and child support, which are taxed at 66 2/3 percent.90 The
House Committee Report on the Family Assistance Plan, however,
took the position that there should be a less-than-100-percent rate be-
cause "a family would have little incentive to assist in obtaining sup-
port from an absent parent if all such income were counted to reduce
assistance payments.""' The incentive consideration did not prevail,
however, for many other sources of income that might be expected to
disappear in the face of a confiscatory tax.
The position taken in the Family Assistance Plan regarding un-
earned income was consistent with its provision denying benefits until
assets (above certain exemptions) have been exhausted.9 2 For example,
to tax fully dividends paid on shares of stock becomes scarcely signifi-
cant once it is decided that the value of the shares themselves are to
be taxed at 100 percent. If the Family Assistance Plan had been imple-
mented either provision probably would have removed any incentive
to save and invest for those who expected to rely eventually upon
Family Assistance Plan benefits. Certainly, these provisions would have
made it impossible for people receiving benefits (particularly the
working poor) to save enough to raise their standard of living above
poverty level. Moreover, such a confiscatory tax could be highly un-
fair because it would reduce the prudent saver who requires assistance
to the same category as his profligate counterpart. But presumably this
unfortunate assault on the puritan ethic is accepted from concern for
88. Under the Social Security Act, by comparison, there was initially a tax of 100%
on earned income (and no tax on unearned income). One reason for the 100% tax
was simply that where there was earned income there had not been a retirement and
therefore there was no occasion for retirement benefits. See Myers, Earnings Test Under
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance: Basis, Background, and Experience, Soc. SEC.
BuLL., May 1964, at 3. In addition, the 100% tax "reflected the prevailing pessimistic
attitude toward the labor market in 1935, when it was hoped to encourage retirement,
thus vacating jobs for younger people." E. BURNS, THE AMEICAN SOCIAL SECuRrY SYSRZM
87 (1949). Presently, there is no tax on the first $1680 of earned income, a 50% tax on
the next $1200 and a 100% tax thereafter (up to the amount of the benefit). See 42
U.S.C. §§ 403(b), 403(f)(3) (1970).
89. H.R. 1, §§ 2152(b), 2153(b)(4).
90. H.R. 1, § 3153(b)(9).
91. H.R. REP. No. 92-231, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess, 178 (1971).
92. See H.R. 1, § 2152(a)(2).
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reducing short-run program costs93 and from a belief that no one should
receive government income-maintenance payments while he still has
any resources with which he can support himself.
In contrast to the position taken by the drafters of the Family
Assistance Plan, the drafters of the Model Statute believed that the
distinction between earned and unearned income should be rejected.
This belief in part reflects that the reference point for the Model
Statute is the positive tax system9 4 and that the statute views income
maintenance to be more like insurance protection than like charity.
9 5
Moreover, the drafters did not want to discourage habits of thrift,
whether in the form of a savings account, a private pension, the equity
in a home or some other asset. Finally, they were certain that much
of the "unearned" income of the people who are most likely to receive
negative income tax benefits would be exhausted very quickly if sub-
ject to a 100 percent tax,96 so that even in the short run the tax would




The positive tax system is rather parsimonious in its allowance of
deductions to wage earners for the costs incurred in connection with
their wage-earning activities. For example, commuting expenses are
nondeductible although in many situations such expenses may be an
unavoidable cost of taking or holding a job.97
It seems likely that for most poor people, commuting costs do not
arise because of any personal preference for a specific residential loca-
tion, but rather because of a decision to take the only job available.98
93. In the long run, of course, depending on the extent to which people can antici-
pate their future need for Family Assistance Plan benefits, costs might be reduced by
leaving an incentive to save and invest.
94. The form taken by the Family Assistance Plan, on the other hand, plainly re-
flects the fact that it was drafted by people whose prior experience had been with the
traditional welfare system. For example, instead of imposing a "tax" on income, at a
given rate, the Plan offsets benefits from income on a dollar-for-dollar basis, but then
"ignores" part of certain income. See H.R. 1, §§ 2152-53.
95. See pp. 452-53 supra.
96. E.g., rent from lodgers and income from modest savings accounts.
97. One such situation arises when a construction worker unable to find work
near his home takes a temporary job requiring him to drive many miles daily to
reach the work site and to return home. See Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting
Expenses: Tax Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of "Simple" Problems,
54 CORNELL L. REv. 871 (1969).
98. See id. at 896.
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Thus, for them, commuting costs are expenses of earning an income;
refusing to allow this deduction not only is unfair but, by substantially
reducing the incentive to work, it also undermines one of the principal
goals of the negative income tax.
Allowance of a deduction for commuting expenses obviously would
create a difficult administrative problem, though seemingly not much
more difficult than the one arising from the positive tax system's rule
allowing the deduction of travel expenses away from home.99 Rules
of thumb no doubt would be required-for example, a rule allowing 12
cents per mile as the cost of commuting in one's own automobile.
Through such rules, and perhaps an arbitrary limitation on total de-
ductions, it seems that allowing a deduction for commuting expenses
would be entirely feasible.
To avoid the administrative burdens imposed by a commuting-
expense deduction while simultaneously including some provision for
such costs to preserve incentives to work, an exemption of a flat dollar
amount of earnings has been proposed. The exemption presumably
could be large enough to defray not only commuting expenses but
also the cost of clothes, meals and union dues. Such a deduction could
even be generous enough to cover amounts withheld from wages for
private pension plans and for OASDHI. The obvious objection to
such an approach is that, if it is adequate for most workers, it will
certainly overcompensate some. 100 This is particularly true if the
exemption is a fixed amount for a relatively long period of time-such
as 720 dollars per year101-rather than a daily allowance or one that
is related to the amount earned. The more accurate approach, allow-
ing actual costs, should at least be tried. If it proves not to be worth
the cost of administration then other approaches can be tried.10 2
Even those who doubt that commuting expenses should be de-
ductible are unlikely to deny the importance of allowing a child care
deduction; it is generally conceded that allowance of such a deduction
99. See INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 162(a)(2).
100. It might be argued that, for the worker who in fact has no significant work-
related expenses, the exemption can be thought of as a device for improving incentives
to work; it is difficult, however, to justify providing an incentive only to those workers
who by chance have jobs involving low work-related costs.
101. See H.R. 1, § 2153(b)(4), allowing an exemption of "the first $720 per year (or
proportionately smaller amounts for shorter periods)."
102. My view on this issue did not prevail in the drafting of the Model Statute,
under which there is no deduction for commuting expenses. As I recall, my cohorts in
the Model Statute venture were not persuaded (as I was) that there are compelling
reasons for departing from the well-known rule of the positive tax system. I would con-
tend that my article on commuting expenses, note 97 supra, adequately meets that
burden of persuasion.
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is essential to preserve the work incentives of poor people.103 The only
serious questions are: how much of a deduction should be allowed,
and under what circumstances? The Model Statute adopted the pro-
vision found in the positive tax law,'10 4 which at the time the Model
Statute was adopted was a narrow provision'0 5 with some rather bizarre
limitations.10 6 In 1971 Congress liberalized this provision significantly
by allowing a deduction for household expenses other than child
care. 0 7 It is certainly questionable whether a welfare program could
be similarly generous without incurring the public's wrath.
In the positive tax system amounts withheld from an employee's
wages and paid into a pension plan are included in his income even
though he could not choose to take the money'08 in lieu of the pension
103. An alternative to allowing such a deduction is to provide free child-care ser-
vices, as under the Family Assistance Plan. See H.R. 1, §H 2112, 2132. Providing such
services in kind seems inconsistent with one of the important objectives of the negative
income tax in that it limits freedom of choice. In addition, if the service is provided
free, as it would be under the Family Assistance Plan, the incentive on the part of the
user to find more economical alternatives and to monitor the costs of the program are
eliminated. With a 50% tax rate under the negative income tax, half of the cost of
child care still rests on the user. Moreover, the poor are treated like the nonpoor in
that they are relied upon to make their own choices about how their children should
be cared for-and for that matter about whether or not it is worthwhile to work
in light of the child care cost.
104. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 212(a), 78 Stat. 19, as amended, INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 214[hereinafter cited as Revenue Act of 1964; provisions of the Act as
codified in the Internal Revenue Code will be indicated in parentheses].
105. Under § 214(b)(1), the maximum deduction was $600 per year for one child
and $900 per year for two or more children (regardless of how many days or months
in the year the taxpayer worked). In certain instances the deduction was reduced dollar
for dollar as income exceeded $6000 per year-which, of course, for people with such
deductions, doubled the tax rate from what it otherwise would have been in the range
just above $6000. See Revenue Act of 1964, § 212 (§ 214(b)).
106. For example, a married man was entitled to a deduction only if his wife had
been incapicitated or institutionalized for at least 90 consecutive days. Revenue Act of
1964, § 212 (§ 214(c)). A married woman could ignore the deduction phase-out for in-
come over $6000, see note 105 supra, if her husband was "incapable of self-support because
mentally or physically defective" or if he had deserted. Revenue Act of 1964, § 212
(§ 214(b)(2)(A), 214(d)(5)). But a man got no deduction at all if he had an able-bodied
wife, even if she had deserted. Revenue Act of 1964, § 212 (§§ 214(a), 214(d)(5)).
107. Deduction of "expenses for household services" is now allowed. See INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 214(b)(2)(A).
108. The employer's contribution, however, is not treated as income of the employee.
Thus, if an employer purports to pay an employee $105 and to withhold $10 for a
pension plan "contribution," the entire $105 is currently taxable to the employee. If,
on the other hand, the employer purports to pay only $95 to the employee and to
make an employer contribution of $10 to a pension plan, the employee is taxed cur-
rently or only $95. Often, an employer will purport to pay $100, will withhold $5 as
an employee contribution and will make an employer contribution of $5, in which case
the taxable income is $100. The fact is, then, that significant tax consequences will flow
from what may be purely formalistic differences in the way in which a pension plan is
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benefit. It seems likely, however, that the poor are more motivated by
the size of their take-home pay than the promise of a future pension.0 9
Accordingly, to preserve the incentive intended by the normal tax
rate under the negative income tax it would be necessary to allow a
deduction for amounts involuntarily withheld from wages for a pen-
sion "contribution.""10  The Federal Insurance Contribution Act
(FICA) tax I' on employee wages (which supports OASDHI) has the
same effect as the employee's contribution to a private pension plan and
raises the same problem. Thus, a strong argument can be made that
the FICA tax should be deductible just as any other tax on wages,112
in order that the negative income tax rate, which presumably will be
very high, will not be increased. But to accept the argument that the
"contribution" to OASDHI should be viewed simply as a tax is to
undercut an article of faith for many-namely, that the amount col-
lected under FICA is not a tax at all but rather the purchase price
of a benefit of great value to all workers. The Model Statute shrinks
from battle on this issue; no deduction for the FICA tax is allowed.
(2) Self-Employed Workers and Investors
The business expenses of farmers, newsstand operators, self-em-
ployed carpenters and other self-employed people obviously must be
deductible. At the same time, if "loopholes" are to be closed on the
income side then it hardly makes sense to leave them open on the
deduction side."' 8 Thus, percentage depletion,"' + accelerated deprecia-
described (though frequently the employer contribution will be nonvested while the
employee contribution is vested).
109. A distinction between the poor and the nonpoor may be drawn on the basis
of an expectation that most poor people will be less likely than nonpoor people to
want to sacrifice current income for a future pension, simply because the poor cannot
afford to buy the pension right.
110. "Contribution" is the word that is normally used despite the fact that the
employee has no choice.
The Model Statute does not allow a deduction. This is another point on which I
deferred to those who considered that a strong enough case had not been made for
departure from the rules of the positive tax system. Refusal to allow a deduction may
also reflect an unwillingness to endorse the notion, implicit (at least) in the argument
for allowing the deduction, that pension rights are of little present value to the poor-
that is, that the poor worker would not think of himself as buying a benefit of much
value to him. To endorse that notion is to disparage a major effort of trade unions.
111. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3101. The discussion applies equally to the
self-employment tax also imposed. TNT. REV CODE OF 1954, § 1401.
112. There never has been any serious question about the necessity for allowing a
deduction for income taxes.
113. See pp. 458-59 supra, discussing the advisability of closing any loopholes.
114. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 613.
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tion,115 the investment credit" 6 and other special deductions must be
disallowed.
The Model Statute disallows the net operating loss carryover"u
because the special accounting rules of the negative income tax already
account for prior losses."18 Current business losses, however, should
remain deductible. Capital losses should also be fully deductible be-
cause capital gains are fully taxed.'19 Interest on money borrowed to
use in a trade or business should be deductible even if the business
loses money. Other interest should be deductible only to the extent
that the loan proceeds produce income so that the interest is properly
regarded as a cost of producing, and therefore a proper offset to, in-
come subject to taxation.
B. Personal Deductions
There are certain expenditures that, even though personal in na-
ture, ought to be deductible. One category of such expenses is court-
ordered alimony and support payments. To the extent that a person's
income is devoted to such payments it is simply not available to meet
living expenses. It may be sensible to ignore certain other expenses that
might equally reduce the amount available to live on-for example,
losses suffered at the race track. But it seems exceedingly unwise to take
a harsh attitude toward payments that are made in fulfillment of both
a legal and moral obligation and for which the basic negative income
tax allowance does not compensate.
If the level of the alimony or support payment reflected actual in-
115. Straight-line depreciation is all that should be allowed, but the Model Statute
mistakenly allows the accelerated depreciation permitted under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 167(b)(2)-(3). The rural rules contain a useful catch-all provision to the effect that
"expenditures for assets having a useful life of more than one year shall be treated as
capital expenditures"-a provision of no small significance to farmers using the cash
method of accounting.
116. Assuming that there is one in the positive tax system. See INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §§ 38, 49. This is actually not a deduction but a credit, of course, but is properly
considered together with the deductions.
117. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172.
118. See Model Statute, supra note 2, § 9. See Asimow & Klein at 6-7.
119. There is, however, a limit in the Model Statute rules designed to first offset
capital losses against earlier capital gain that received favorable tax treatment because
the individual was subject to the positive tax system.
It might be argued that capital losses should be ignored except to the extent that
capital gain was counted as income that reduced benefits under the negative income
tax in earlier years. Otherwise a person with a one-time large capital loss might become
entitled to benefits, despite a high normal level of income. The carry-over concept in
the accounting rules, see Model Statute, supra note 2, § 9; Asimow & Klein at 10-16,
would substantially reduce benefits in such cases, but would not totally eliminate bene-
fits because of the limited life of the carryover.
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come then this would undermine the work incentive contemplated
by the negative income tax rate structure. And if the state courts did
not adjust the level of alimony and support payment to the payor's
actual income (but rather to potential income) then the federal
government would probably be compelled to intervene in some way.
Otherwise the negative income tax payments intended to provide basic
support for a man's present family would be diverted to the family of
his previous marriage whenever a state court determined that he ought
to be earning more than he was.
It would be possible, of course, to deny a deduction for alimony
and support payments, while simultaneously increasing the payor's
basic allowance, by allowing him to treat as a dependent any person
to or for whom an alimony or support payment is made. But then in
order to avoid inaccuracy, the increase in the basic allowance would
still have to reflect the amount of the payment. The allowance of a
deduction seems the simpler, more direct method of reaching the
same result, although increase of the basic allowance would avoid
hardship whenever a person must continue to make alimony and sup-
port payments despite the loss of his job.
Among the poor, voluntary support payments and gifts are likely
to be made under much the same circumstances and serve much the
same function served by court-ordered alimony and support payments.
The principal difference that might cause concern is that voluntary
payments could be made to "beat the system." It is conceivable (but,
to this author, barely so) that a poor person might make a gift to a
wealthier friend or relative for this purpose if a deduction were al-
lowed. The gift, if deductible, would result in an increase in the
donor's benefits while the recipient (subject only to the positive tax,
under which gifts are not treated as income)12 would suffer no cor-
responding detriment. Thus, this gift would cause a net increase in
government expenditures. To foreclose this admittedly remote possibili-
ty, the Model Statute allows a deduction for gifts only when the donee
is subject to the negative income tax and therefore required to include
the gift in his income.
The basic allowance should also compensate the recipient for rea-
sonable, foreseeable medical expenditures. If this is done, free basic
medical services need not be provided and the incentive for in-
dividuals to avoid the frivolous use of medical services is preserved.
Substantial disbursements for nonrecurring medical problems cannot
be covered by the basic allowance. Perhaps such costs should be borne
by the federal government under the negative income tax or under
120. See INT. R v. CODE OF 1954, § 102.
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some other program of universal health care or insurance for the poor.
But the possibility of providing such a benefit raises issues that are
beyond the scope of the negative income tax to resolve. The negative in-
come tax offers no relief to the family with extraordinary medical
expenses and no income (other than negative income tax benefits), but
it does seem appropriate to allow a deduction from income for such
expenses. The positive tax system affords precedent for such a subsidi-
zation of medical care; 121 supporters of the deduction need not break
new ground in a difficult and controversial area.
The question of the deductibility of taxes based on income has
already been examined.1 22 There remains the question of the deducti-
bility of other taxes that can now be deducted under the positive in-
come tax-most notably the property tax and the general sales tax.
Both of these can properly be viewed as costs of consumption. As such
they should not be deductible. Refusal to allow a deduction would
seem correct but for the fact that some states have no income tax and
therefore rely heavily for revenue on property taxes and, even more
so, on sales taxes. People in those states will be worse off, in the absence
of a deduction, than people living in other states, simply because of the
tax policies of the states of their residence. Despite these problems of
fairness and federalism, the Model Statute allows a deduction only for
income taxes.
The other major categories of personal deductions allowed under
the positive tax system are charitable contributions' 23 casualty losses
1 2
'
and interest on personal debts. 25 No one has seriously proposed that
such deductions should be allowed under the negative income tax
(which may tell something about the positive income tax).128 Discus-
sion in this article of the possibility of allowing such deductions seems
unnecessary.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article reveals that determination of who is entitled to what
benefits requires an elaborate set of (possibly unarticulated) rules.
These rules can significantly affect the success of the negative income
tax in achieving its goals and, in the aggregate, they may be vital to
its success.1 27
121. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 213.
122. See pp. 480-83 supra.
123. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170.
124. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165(c)(3).
125. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163.
126. See R. GOODE, supra note 55, at 157-63, 168-75.
127. Cf. Klein, Family Unit passim; Asimow & Klein passim.
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The emphasis here has been on the negative income tax; but the
negative income tax is merely a member of a larger class of programs
to relieve poverty. The problem of defining income also arises in pro-
grams for public housing, medical care, food stamps and education
subsidies. Thus an analysis of problems faced in implementing the
broad objectives of the negative income tax are relevant to other pro-
grams in which benefits are based on need.
It seems clear, if only for political reasons, that the negative in-
come tax cannot merely adopt the rules of the positive income tax
as early proponents suggested. 128 Nor can it imitate the pattern of
traditional welfare programs (as, to a considerable extent, the Family
Assistance Plan did) without sacrificing many of its goals. Goals of in-
come maintenance and other poverty-relief programs, and the social
and ethical assumptions on which those goals are founded, often remain
vague, imprecise and confused until people are forced to examine
them in order to reach concrete rule-making decisions. It is my hope
that beyond simply supplying a diagram of the necessary plumbing for
an income-maintenance structure, this article will promote and con-
tribute to such an examination of goals and assumptions.
128. E.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 192 (1962).
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APPENDIX
The following provisions relating to the definition of income are taken from Handler
& Klein, A Model Statute Reflecting the Recommendations of the President's Com-
mission on Income Maintenance Programs, in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON INCOME
MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS: TECHNICAL STUDIES, 293, 297-300 (1970).
Section 8. Definition of income.
A. In General.
For the purposes of this part, a person's available income shall be his adjusted gross
income, as defined in section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, with the modi-
fications provided by subsections (B) through (H).
B. Amounts Added to Adjusted Gross Income.
For the purposes of subsection (a), adjusted gross income for any period shall in-
clude the amount of the following items which accrue or are received during such period
to the extent they are not already included in the definition of adjusted gross income
in section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954:
(1) The entire amount of any payments received as an annuity, pension, or retire-
ment benefit,
(2) The amount or value of any and all prizes and awards,
(3) The proceeds of any life insurance policy in excess of $1,000,
(4) All gifts (cash or otherwise), support and alimony payments, inheritances, and
trust distribution of capital, in excess of a total of $50 per year, except for any gift
or support payment or other transfer received from a member of the same family unit
or from a private charity and except for any property (other than insurance proceeds)
inherited from a deceased spouse, provided that amounts received from any person who
is living in the same dwelling as the filer but is not a member of the filer's unit shall
not be considered gifts or support payments to the extent that they do not exceed the
greater of $25 per week or the actual cost of housing and feeding such nonmember
person, and provided that any amount that is received and paid for tuition, fees, and
books at any institution described in section 151(e)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 shall not be deemed to be a gift or support payment, and provided that no amount
received under any government program in which the need of the recipient is an es-
sential prerequisite of the award shall be deemed to be a gift or support payment,
(5) Interest on all government obligations,
(6) Except as otherwise provided in this part, any amount received in the form of
damages, insurance payments, workmen's compensation, or in any other form as (i)
compensation for physical, mental or any other personal injuries or sickness, (ii) wage
or income continuation payments, or (iii) payments for medical expenses,
(7) The rental value of parsonages,
(8) Certain combat pay and mustering-out payments to members of the Armed
Forces excluded from adjusted gross income by sections 112-113 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954,
(9) The full amount of all dividends, including periodic payments that are a return
of capital, except insurance dividends, that are used to offset premiums,
(10) The full amount of any scholarship or fellowship, including the value of room
and board supplied without charge, to the extent that such scholarship or fellowship
exceeds the costs of tuition, fees, and books,
(11) The amount by which living expenses of the family unit are reduced when
an employer supplies meals or lodging at less than their fair market value, regardless
of whether the arrangement was made for the convenience of the employer,
(12) An amount paid by the government to a member of the Armed Forces as an
allowance for quarters or subsistence or a gratuity pay,
(13) The amount of current or accumulated income that could, within the discre-
tion of any person with a nonadverse interest, be paid to an individual from a trust
or estate of which he is a designated beneficiary, except that any such amount not ex-
ceeding $3,000 and in fact paid to some other person shall not be so included,
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(14) All amounts deductible under section 1202 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954,
(15) All unemployment compensation, from whatever source derived, whether from
government insurance programs or otherwise,
(16) Strike benefits received from any union or other organization or agency,
(17) All cash benefits received pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act,
(18) Railroad Retirement Act cash benefits,
(19) Cash benefits under laws administered by the Veterans' Administration except
for those which are income conditioned,
(20) Foreign source income presently excludable under sections 893, 894, 911, 912,
931, and 943 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
(21) Amounts received as loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation,
(22) Items presently deductible under sections 173, 175, 180, 182, 263(c), 615, and 616
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
(23) An amount equal to the total of all federal and state income tax refunds
multiplied by two, and
(24) (a) An amount equal to 10 percent of the "net usable wealth" owned by all
members of such unit less the amount of any capital distribution from a trust that has
been included in income by virtue of Section 8(B)(4) where the principal of such trust
is included in the computation of net usable wealth and less the amount of income
actually derived from property described in subsection (b)(v) below.
(b) Net usable wealth is an amount equal to the sum of:
(i) the equity in property used in a trade or business in excess of $10,000, or the
equity in a trade or business that includes an owner-occupied home in excess of $20,000;
(ii) the equity in an owner-occupied home not included in (i) above in excess
of $10,000;
(iii) the amount by which the total of all cash, checking accounts, savings accounts,
and equity in savings bonds, of all members of the unit taken together, exceeds $1,500;
(iv) the cash value of life insurance policies owned by all members of the unit in
excess of $5,000; and
(v) the amount of equity in all other property, real or personal, tangible or in-
tangible, of any kind (including property held in trust if such property is required to be
or, in the discretion of a member of the unit or any person, may be distributed presently
to any members of the unit) except clothing, furniture, automobiles with a total value
less than $4,000, and personal effects, with a total value of less than $250 per member
of the filing unit, and except the value of any pension, annuity, or retirement benefit,
less the total of all unsecured debts of all members of the unit.
(c) The term equity as used above means the fair market value of the property
less the amount of debt secured by it.
C. Deductions Allowed.
For the purposes of subsection (a), adjusted gross income for any period may be
reduced by the amount of the following items which accrue, are paid, or are other-
wise deductible during such period, to the extent that they have not already been de-
ducted from adjusted gross income under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954:
(1) All expenses for medical care within the meaning of sections 213 (e) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, except that-
(A) this deduction shall not apply to expenses compensated for by insurance or
otherwise, where such compensation has been excluded from available income, and
(B) deductions can be made under this section only to the extent that the aggregated
medical expenses of the family unit during the current reporting period plus the
preceding eleven reporting periods exceeds $120 multiplied by the number of members
of the unit.
(2) Alimony, separate maintenance, and support payments made by any member
of the unit,
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(3) The value of any gift to a member of a family unit other than the donor's
where the donee is a member of a family unit receiving payments under this Act,
(4) All deductions presently allowable under sections 162 and 212 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954,
(5) Any deduction allowable under section 214 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, except that for purposes of this Act "dependent" in section 214(d)(1) shall mean
any person under 18 years old who is a member of the unit,
(6) All amounts deductible under section 404 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
and
(7) An amount equal to the total of all federal and state income taxes paid by
all members of the unit multiplied by two.
D. Losses.
In determining adjusted gross income the losses that are deductible under Sections
165 and 166 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, except for losses described in Section
165 (C) (3), shall be allowed as deductions and losses from the sale, exchange, or dis-
position of capital assets, used in a trade or business or held for the production of
income may be deducted without limitation, to the extent that they exceed capital gains
realized during the preceding three years (other than capital gains that were reported
and reduced benefits that would otherwise have been payable under this part).
E. Interest.
No deduction shall be allowed for interest except for (1) interest on a loan, the
proceeds of which are used in the payor's trade or business, or (2) interest on a loan
secured by property that produces income that is included in the unit's income under
any provision of section 8 (including Section 8 (B) (24)), but only to the extent of such
income.
F. Depreciation and Depletion.
In determining available income, a deduction shall be allowed for depreciation and
depletion only to the extent permitted by sections 167 and 611 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954; but no deductions shall be permitted for depletion calculated pursuant to
section 613 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
G. Deductions Disallowed.
Deductions from income other than those specifically allowed in this section are dis-
allowed. No item shall be deducted more than once.
H. Subchapter S Corporations.
Any amount attributed to the available income of a member of the family unit by
operation of section 1373 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 shall be increased by
an amount proportional to the amount by which the taxable income of the electing
corporation would be increased if computed under this section.
I. Internal Revenue Code Applicable.
Except where this Act provides or necessarily implies otherwise the provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 shall apply in the determination of available in.
come.
